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Abstract
Inter Control Center Communication Protocol (ICCP) plays a critical role in the Supervisory Control and
Data Acquisition (SCADA) architecture by allowing utilities to exchange data in real time. Given the
critical nature of ICCP, security of ICCP is of paramount importance to power community. However, the
present state of ICCP security can be best described as an afterthought. The protocol itself does not provide
strong authentication and authorization primitives. Furthermore, like many other protocols, interpretation of
ICCP’s standards is subject to user’s interpretation and can aggravate the security situation if not interpreted
and implemented in a uniform manner. In this work we undertake the task of formalizing parts of ICCP
protocol and analyze and address the potential security issues found within those parts. We develop model
of the protocol in a model checking tool called UPPAAL and then use Computation Tree Logic (CTL)
properties over this model to see if they are valid. Once a problem is identified, we design a checker that
can detect exploitation of the identified vulnerabilities. The soundness of these checkers is then verified by
validating properties on the system in conjunction with this new checker.
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Chapter 1
Introduction and Motivation
The power grid relies heavily on a number of different protocols so as to perform its day to day operations
successfully. These protocols are used to carry information between both inter and intra-substation entities.
Inter Control Center Communication protocol (ICCP) is one such protocol that is of great importance to
power grid community as it carries real time data as well as commands between two control centers. Given
the sensitive nature of the information exchanged between utilities over this protocol, it is necessary to make
sure that this information does not get corrupted on its way to the destination entities. At a minimum
we would require that whenever such a situation arises, an operator is apprised of it so that he can take
corrective measures and ensure smooth operation of services. Furthermore, we also require that the protocol
has no intrinsic vulnerabilities that can be used as a mean of disrupting the system and services through
remote exploitation of these vulnerabilities. Thus, we need to check the protocol against such subtler forms
of vulnerabilities that could lead the system to potentially unsafe states.
There already exist proposals to make ICCP secure by adding an encryption and authorization layer
beneath ICCP [11]. The primary focus of these efforts is to prevent unauthorized access to ICCP data
between communicating nodes and also to protect the integrity of data. Furthermore, message replay attacks
are prevented by using sequence numbers, e.g. as done in TCP. However, little efforts have been made to
understand the intrinsic weaknesses in the protocol itself. Such weaknesses can lead to more subtler form
of vulnerabilities than Man-In-The-Middle(MITM) attacks, as we will see later. Although we do need to
consider and prevent against MITM attacks, the focus of this work is to study and understand any potential
vulnerabilities that might be present due to intrinsic weaknesses in the protocol. Our goal is to find such
vulnerabilities and to augment the protocol with a set of checkers so that the protocol is secured against the
vulnerabilities found. This is necessary because modifying the protocol itself might require fork-lift changes
to the widely deployed ICCP base and hence is not a viable solution. We also emphasize here that our focus
is on the conceptual vulnerabilities rather than implementation specific vulnerabilities. Thus even with our
checking mechanisms in place, implementation specific bugs may still make the system prone to attacks.
In summary, we make the following contributions through this work: 1. Formal modeling of parts of
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ICCP protocol 2. Manual and automatic vulnerability analysis of parts of the protocol 3. Checker designs
that can alarm the operator when any of the aforementioned vulnerabilities are exploited by a client.
2
Chapter 2
Approach
Our approach is described as a flow chart in Figure 2.1 and is inspired by the work flow presented in [12].
Unlike their approach of focusing on modifying the protocol to mitigate or eliminate vulnerabilities this work
focuses on the design of communication checkers to detect vulnerability exploitation. Our approach can be
broken down into three major phases: modeling the system, modeling the attacker, and designing/validating
the checker.
Model the 
protocol
Define safety
properties
Verify the 
properties 
over the 
defined model
Refine the 
model and 
properties
Model the 
attacker
Verify properties 
over system and 
attacker models
System safe
Refine the 
model
Design 
checker
Verify properties 
over system, 
attacker, and 
checker models 
Properties 
hold?
Properties 
hold?
Properties hold or 
violation detected?
Counter trace 
shows a valid 
attack?
System model design loop Threat model design loop Detection model design loop
yes
no
yes
yes
yesno
no
no
Figure 2.1: Formal Design Approach
In the first phase, a formal model of the protocol is defined along with correctness properties for the
protocol. These correctness properties are captured using a set of computation tree logic (CTL) formulas.
The properties are then verified using UPAAL’s model checking tool. We expect these properties to hold in
the absence of an attacker or flaws in the protocol. In case of violation of properties in this phase, we rectify
the system model so as to remove the modeling errors that might have caused the verification of properties
to fail.
In the second phase, a generic attacker model is added to the system. An attacker model is required so
as to probe bad states in the system where a client is denied service; It is not possible to find such states or
the sequence of actions that could lead to such states if we don’t have an attacker model. Once this model is
added, the model checking tool is run again to verify correctness properties defined previously. If the model
checking shows a violation of one or more of the properties, we use the counter trace produced by the model
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checking tool to guide the design of a communication checker. This checker model is then incorporated into
the system. The goal here is not to be proactive in defending against attack but to alert the operator when
conditions that could potentially result in a violation take place, i.e. an attacker should not go undetected
in the event of an attack.
Finally, CTL formulas are specified to verify the validity of the checker. Those properties are then verified
by the model checking tool again. If a violation is observed, the checker is updated to ensure that the goal
of detecting potential attacks is met.
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Chapter 3
Protocol Overview
The Inter Control Center Communication protocol (ICCP) has sprung from the deregulation efforts by the
industry to create open standard for communication between utilities [14]. The movement that started
in 1980’s, led by Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) to create a Utility Communication Architecture
(UCA), which succeeded in standardizing ICCP that also came to be called as Telecontrol Application Service
Element 2 (TASE.2) at that time. Since then ICCP has become increasingly popular among utilities, and
has been used to connect control centers so that they can exchange both operational and non-operational
data.
ICCP embodies an object oriented design where data or devices in a given control center appear as
objects to a remote control center and the remote control center can do operations on these objects by using
the exposed interfaces [5]. This not only made the design of applications which use this information simpler,
but it also provides operators with the ability to create custom primitives/objects. Beneath it, ICCP uses
Manufacturing Message Specification (MMS), which is a protocol initially introduced in factory automation
but found widespread use in power systems. A mapping from ICCP objects to the MMS services is defined
in the standards.
Although ICCP follows a client-server paradigm, a given entity can act both as a client and a server at a
given point in time. Whether an entity acts as a client or server to another communicating entity depends
on the agreement between two control centers. This agreement is referred to as a “Bilateral Table” in the
standards. Depending on the role of communicating control centers, one of the control centers exposes lists
of operations that can be performed on list of objects (devices) that it possesses. Since this control center
serves the requests of remote control center, we refer to this control center as a “Server” in our ICCP model.
The remote control center that requests resources or performs operations on these resources is referred
to as a “Client.” Depending on their role, control centers from now on will be referred as a client or server
only. Note that the requested objects can be either concrete devices like transformers, relays etc., or could
also be abstract data structures like Transfer Sets etc. Access to manipulate all these objects contained in
a given server is generally controlled by the mutual agreement between those two entities, and is codified in
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the Bilateral Table.
In terms of its functionality, ICCP is divided into 9 blocks. Utilities are free to implement any of the
blocks while deploying ICCP, however, Block 1 is mandatory for any utility that claims to be conforming to
ICCP. Other blocks may be added on top of this basic block to provide extra services. Table B in Appendix B
shows the functionality each block is capable of providing. In this dissertation, we consider a part of ICCP
for the purpose of security analysis. Our selection of these parts is based on the observation that these
sections of the protocol involve resource allocation/deallocation and hence need to be analyzed.
3.1 Devices in ICCP
Block 5 of the ICCP standard defines device control mechanisms that ICCP can provide to remote control
centers. There can be two types of devices associated with a given control center: Direct Control (Non-
SBO) and Select-Before-Operate(SBO) devices. SBO devices are critical because they enable clients to
request exclusive access to them. Availability of these devices is important because preventing legitimate
clients from accessing devices for an extended time period might disrupt operations, and could potentially
cause instability. We are thus interested in modeling the way SBO devices can be selected and operated
to investigate if an attacker could abuse this feature. As defined in the standards, Operations are the
requests that client makes to the server that could lead to a change in the device state. Actions on the other
hand are the activities performed by the server under certain circumstances and might not have anything
to do with the operations. {Select, Operate , Set Tag Value, Get Tag Value} and {Timeout, Local
Reset, Success, Failure} are the list of actions and operations, respectively, that are defined for SBO
devices. Figure 3.1 shows the functionality of the protocol as an SDL-like diagram. Note that the diagram
uses an extra construct which is not defined in standard SDL. Specifically, the element shown with a dotted
boundary depicts an internal event and is an extension to SDL.
The device initially starts in ‘IDLE’ state. Upon receiving a ‘Select’ request from a client, the request
is checked for the type of device that it wants to address and then the status of the device is also checked
by looking at the tag that the device is carrying at that instance in time. If the checks pass then the device
moves to the ‘ARMED’ state. In this state if the device does not receive any operate command within some
time bound, it will move back to the ‘IDLE’ state. This “internal” timeout event is represented by a dotted
shape (This is an add-on construct to SDL; SDL maintains that the transition from one state to another
should solely be based on a new received signal/message). On the other hand if an ‘Operate’ request is
received in time then the ‘Command’ type of that request is checked in conjunction with the device tag
status to determine any hindrance to operate the device. If the ‘Command’ type and the device tags are
6
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Figure 3.1: Device Functionality
compatible then the operation may succeed and the device is then again sent back to the ‘IDLE’ state.
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Figure 3.2: Transfer Set Operations
3.2 Transfer Set Allocation
Transfer sets are not covered by a single block of ICCP, rather they can be found in multiple blocks (1,4,8
and 9) and are associated with the type of object being monitored. In our case we consider the Data Set
Transfer Set and operations associated with it. Transfer Sets are defined in the standards as “objects used
to control data exchange by associating data values with transmission parameters such as time intervals. For
example, there are four types of Transfer Sets: Data Set Transfer Sets, Time Series Transfer Sets, Transfer
Account Transfer Sets, and Information Message Transfer Sets.” Although we talk about Data Set Transfer
Set operations here, the functionality of other Transfer Sets is quite similar with differences in type of data
they handle. Essentially, the Data Set Transfer Set is a mechanism used by ICCP clients to retrieve data
values related to a single physical object. This data set is transferred from the server to the client based on
the transfer conditions e.g. interval timeout, value change, an integrity time out, or at operator’s request.
More specifically, the Transfer Set object operations that an ICCP client can perform as defined within
TASE.2 are: Start Transfer, Stop Transfer, Get Next DSTransfer Set Value, and Get Next TSTransfer Set
Value. The relationship of these operations (derived from informal description of the standards) is shown in
Figure 3.2.
As shown in Figure 3.2, client uses a “Get Next DSTransfer Set Value” operation before starting the data
transfer. This operation allocates one of the available transfer sets to the requesting client, if possible. Once
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the transfer set is allocated, the client requests to start the transfer. Server checks this request to see if the
transfer set type matches with the data set transfer set type. If it does not match i.e the transfer set type is
one of the Time Series Transfer Sets, Transfer Account Transfer Sets, or Information Message Transfer Sets
then the server starts to monitor the events specified by the client, otherwise Report By Exception (RBE)
flag is used to determine how to report the data. After checking RBE, the server waits for the time specified
by the client as the instant when it should start monitoring events and when this time is reached the server
enters the monitoring state. In this state if a specific ‘event’ occurs then the data is reported back to the
client as MMS PDU(s). Data may also be reported in case when a condition is met e.g. in case of periodic
data transfer, the time interval elapses and demands sending the data to client.
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Chapter 4
Properties of Interest
To understand the security properties of interest in context of ICCP, one should consider the intrinsic
security mechanisms built into ICCP when it was proposed. ICCP’s development started in 1980’s and like
many other power grid protocols little consideration was given to the security aspect of ICCP. Since the
protocol allows data to be sent as clear-text on wire, it provides no inherent authentication mechanisms
and does not mandate the access control implementation (in the form of BLT) for the resources that a
server shares with clients, security of ICCP is of great concern to utilities. Furthermore, there is always a
potential for misinterpretation of the informal description of the protocol which can further aggravate the
security situation of ICCP because if two vendors implement different variants of the protocol then there
may be inconsistencies in the way they inter-operate and these loopholes might be exploited by faulty clients
inadvertently or willingly by malicious clients.
A good starting point to determine the security properties to monitor for ICCP is to consider the classic
Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability (CIA) trio. Among these three pillars of security we have been
considering integrity and availability as the critical properties for ICCP. First, the clear-text nature of the
protocol is problematic because a compromised node or a malicious insider can cause man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attacks and can change the contents of the packets that are traversing through it. This is an
important concern because the remote control centers use ICCP to adjust set points of physical devices (e.g.,
relays and breakers) over the network. A higher or lower set point value than the normal value might cause
serious harm not only to the devices but also to the personnel around the device. Second, availability (also
called liveness) is important for the proper functioning of the overall system because if resources are not
properly handled by a server then legitimate clients may be denied access to resources by a rogue client.
In that sense, liveness properties are particularly interesting in a power grid setup because they can reveal
more subtler weaknesses in the protocol. Finally, confidentiality might not be important in context of ICCP
because the protocol carries control data like set points etc. which we believe will already be well known
among operators. In conclusion, we study two kinds of resource exhaustion vulnerabilities in context of
ICCP networks which can give rise to denial of service attacks.
10
Chapter 5
Device Object Modeling in UPPAAL
In this chapter we delve into the formal modeling and checking of the protocol. It is not practical to model
the entire ICCP protocol as that would lead to state space explosion. So we only model parts that are related
to object resource allocation as they are potentially vulnerable to resource exhaustion. Specifically we model
access to devices using Select-Before-Operate and allocation of transfer sets. In this chapter we illustrate
our approach using the former model, which allows a client to request exclusive access to a device before
operating on it. Next chapter covers the latter part of ICCP. A brief introduction to UPPAAL is provided
in Appendix A. Readers are also encouraged to see UPPAAL’s documentation for further information.
5.1 Model Overview
We model the Client, Server and Device in UPPAAL. These models share messages by using synchronization
channels. Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the channels shared between each entity. The channel names
are shown in bold and the directionality of a channel is specified by the arrow heads. The figure also shows
the list of shared variables used to pass messages between automata. Names of the variables are shown in
italics which are then followed by the type indexed by the value they take in UPPAAL models. Also note
that the client takes its identifier as a parameter and is shown with an underline. This parameter is used
by the client to identify itself to the server. This helps the server to keep track of requests from different
connected clients and facilitates the server in replying to the requests of the clients.
Figure 5.1: System Overview
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5.2 Client Model
The model of the client is shown in Figure 5.2. Client makes a request to server only if the server is not
busy. Requests are sent over the Request channel in conjunction with the RequestType variable, where value
of RequestType is used by the server to determine which operation among {Select, Operate, Set Tag
Value} is being requested by the client. Note that we don’t model the Get Tag Value operation because it
does not change the state of the device in any way. Once the client sends a Select request it waits for the
server response by listening to {Success[id], Failure[id]} channels. Here id is a parameter of the client
which is used by the client to identify itself to the server. If the ‘Select’ request succeeds, the client jumps
to the Selected state. This state is not ‘committed’ in the model but has an invariant to ensure that it
makes a request before device times out to an idle state. It can make either an ‘Operate’ or ‘Set Tag Value’
request to the server. In that case, it moves to either OperateSent or TagSent states and listens again to
the synchronization channels for the server’s response. Note that two edges in the client model have a guard
based on clock c. These guards along with the invariants on the starting states ensure that the client waits
for some time before making a new request. In absence of such guards, client can make infinite requests to
the server without letting time pass – leading to time locks which when present in the system can act as a
barrier to the verification of a property. Another interesting point to note here that the client model adheres
strictly to the protocol. This is unlike a rogue client which might not send requests in a specified order.
end!
c<=1
c<=1
begin!
Success[id]?
Failure[id]?
RequestType:=0,
clientID:=id,
c:=0
SelectedFlag:=true,
SelectSuccess:=true,
Clock:=0
c<=1
c<=1
TagType:int[0,1]
CmdType:Cmd_t
RequestType:=1,
Cmd:=CmdType,
clientID:=id,
numTagSent:=0,
SelectSuccess:=false
c>=1
(sBusy or SelectedFlag) and c>=1
Request! numTagSent<TagSentLimit
c>=1
Request!
Success[id]?
Failure[id]?
Success[id]?
Request!
Failure[id]?
Failure[id]?
sBusy==0 and !SelectedFlagStart
SelectSent
Wait1
Initial Selected OperateSent
TagSent
Wait2
OperateSuccess:=true, SelectedFlag:=false,
Clock:=0
c:=0
numTagSent++,
c:=0
c:=0
c:=0
RequestType:=2,
Tag:=TagType,
clientID:=id
c:=0
Figure 5.2: Client Model in UPPAAL
5.3 Server Model
Figure 5.3 shows the model of the server in UPPAAL. Server waits in the Start state for a request from
clients. Once a request arrives on the Request channel the server moves to the RequestReceived state and
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Figure 5.3: Server Model in UPPAAL
c<=Timeout
end?
begin?
c==Timeout
Unsafe
Safe
Wait
c:=0
Figure 5.4: Observer Model
based on the RequestType variable it sends a Set Tag Value, Select or an Operate request to the device
by synchronizing with it over SetTag, Select or Operate channels respectively. This request from the server
to the device results in either success or failure. Error is indicated to the server over Error channel and
success is indicated over either of the DevTagged, Selected or Operated channels. Based on the type of
response that the server receives from the device, the server signals success or failure to the requesting client
using the Success[clientID]or Failure[clientID] channels respectively. Note that clientID is a global
variable which is set by the client when making a request and is used by the server to respond back to it.
5.4 Device Model
Device behavior in presence of different inputs from the server is shown in Figure 5.5. A device starts in
IdleStart state and can move non-deterministically to either of the No Tag or OtherTag states. Transition
to these states ‘tags’ the device with two of the four possible tag values. Once the device has moved to
one of these states, it listens to Select channel for requests from the server. If a Select synchronization is
initiated by the server then the device transits to SelectReceived state and then goes to the ArmedState
after signaling the server about successful select using the Armed channel. In the ArmedState, the device
sets up a timer and listens to Select, Operate, and SetTag channels for requests from the server. A Select
synchronization in ArmedState leads to Error signal being sent to the server but the timer is reset by the
device if the requesting client ID is found to be the same as the client ID that armed the device in first
place. If an Operate synchronization is received in ArmedState then the device checks if the client that
armed the device is actually performing the ‘Operate’. If this is the case then the device checks the current
tag value along with the ‘Command’ attribute of the ‘Operate’ request to see if the combination allows the
device to be operated. In case all checks are passed, the device performs the ‘Operate’ operation, signals the
success to server over Operated channel and transits back to the Idle state. The third possibility while in
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SetTag?
Select?
DevTagged!
DevTagged!
Error!
Operate?
Operated!
Error!
SetTag?
SetTag? c<Timeout
Error!
Select?SetTag?
Operate?
Error!
Tagged:=1 Tagged==0 and lastArmID==clientID
Tagged==1 || Tagged==0 || (Tagged==2 and Cmd==1)
Tagged!=0 and lastTagID==clientID and lastArmID==clientID
(Tagged!=0 and lastTagID!=clientID) or lastArmID!=clientID
Tagged==3 || (Tagged==2 and Cmd==0)
lastArmID!=clientID
lastArmID!=clientID
lastArmID==clientID
Operate?
Armed!
Select?
Operate?
c==TimeoutError!
Error!
Select?
Error!
lastArmID==clientID
ArmedState
IdleStart OtherTag
Fail1
Idle
SetTagReceived
Fail3
Fail2
OperateOrFail
No_Tag
SelectReceived
OperateReceivedc:=0
Tagged:=Tag,
lastTagID:=clientID
c:=0
Tagged:=Tag
c:=0 lastArmID:=-1,SelectedFlag:=false
c:=0
Tagged:=0
lastArmID:=clientID,
c:=0
c:=0,
SelectedFlag:=false
Figure 5.5: Device Model in UPPAAL
ArmedState is to get a SetTag signal. Upon receiving this synchronization, the device checks whether the
client should be able to set the tag. This depends on the current device tag as well as on the condition that
the client that tagged the device previously is trying to modify the tag. If appropriate conditions are met
then the new device tag is stored in the Tagged variable and a success message is sent to the server using
DevTagged synchronization. If no message is received by the device in the ArmedState within a Timeout
units of time then the device transits to the Idle state automatically.
5.5 Correctness Property
Table 5.1 shows the different properties that can be modeled in UPPAAL. For the purpose of check-
ing time bounded liveness, we used the following properties: 1) E<> client.Clock>Limit, 2) A[] not
observer.Unsafe.
In the first property we search the system for a state where Clock goes above a certain user defined time
limit, Limit. Clock is a local clock to the client model and keeps track of elapsed time since last succes
The second property is used to verify the client’s ability to successfully ‘Operate’ the device within
Table 5.1: Properties in UPPAAL as CTL Formulas
# Property Type Description
1 A[]p Safety p holds in all states in all paths
2 E〈〉p Reachability p holds in at least one state
3 A〈〉p Liveness p holds in at least one state in all paths
4 E[]p Safety p holds in all states of at least one path
5 p→ q Liveness Whenever p is satisfied q is satisfied
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Timeout units of time after ‘Selecting’ the device. This observer pattern for checking time bounded reach-
ability from one state to another has been inspired by [6]. Figure 5.4 shows the observer model. The basic
idea here is that when the client successfully selects a device, it synchronizes with the observer over the
begin channel. Once synchronized the observer waits for the client to tell it about its successful ‘Operate’
operation of the device. If the client successfully operates the device and informs the observer in due time
(using end channel) then the observer moves to the Safe state otherwise it moves to the Unsafe state.
5.6 Attacker Model
Our goal is to discover vulnerabilities and design checkers to detect their potential exploitation rather than
focusing on specific attacks. Therefore, we define a generic attacker model as depicted in Figure 5.6, which
can send messages at will and is not constrained by the state transition model of the standard protocol.
Unlike a protocol compliant client, it can send any combination of request type and associated parameters.
After making a request, it listens to Failure[id] and Success[id] for failure or success, respectively.
Afterwards, it waits before making a new request. The only constraint we placed on the attacker is that
some time elapses between two consecutive requests. This is to ensure that we don’t run into time locks.
Starting with this initial model, we explore vulnerabilities in the system iteratively, as shown in Figure 2.1.
Once we find a counter trace, we first examine it to determine whether it actually exhibits a valid vulnerability
or not. As an example of the latter kind of traces, a counter trace from UPPAAL showed that the property
does not hold because the client does not make a request at all in that time period. Since these traces were
an artifact of the initial client model, we refine the model to make requests at least once per time unit.
Finally, if the counter trace found indicates a valid vulnerability, we constrain the attacker model to avoid
that trace in future experiments so that we can check for the existence of different vulnerabilities or to see
whether the same vulnerability could be reached by a different set/order of events.
We check the first correctness property from Section 5.5 after introducing an attacker in the system. This
resulted in a counter trace where the attacker sends ‘Select’ requests to the server over and over again after
arming the device, and does not allow the device to transit to Idle state, representing a valid vulnerability
exploitation. We then restrain the attacker model with a maximum number of ‘Select’ requests, resulting in
the model shown in Figure 5.7. The first correctness property holds true but the second property fails with
this attacker, revealing a new vulnerability in which even if the client is able to arm the device, an attacker
can still prevent the client from operating it. The counter trace shows that the attacker uses the tag ‘Open-
and-Close-Inhibit’, which disallows anyone to operate the device. We then further constrain the attacker
model by preventing the use of such a tag, but a new counter trace is found by UPPAAL, in which the
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c<=2*Timeout
Success[id]?
CmdType:Cmd_t,
ReqType:Req_t,
TagType:Tag_t
clientID:=id,
RequestType:=ReqType,
Cmd:=CmdType,
Tag:=TagType,
c:=0
c>=2
Failure[id]?
Request!
sBusy==0 RequestSentStart FailedOrSucceded
c:=0
Figure 5.6: First Attacker Model in UPPAAL
Request!
c<=1
Success[id]?
Success[id]?
ReqType:int[1,2]
c<=2*Timeout
CmdType:Cmd_t,
ReqType:Req_t,
TagType:Tag_t
c<=2
clientID:=id,
RequestType:=ReqType,
Cmd:=CmdType,
Tag:=TagType,
c:=0
RequestType!=0
RequestType!=0 || (RequestType==0 and !SelectedFlag and numSelects<2)
RequestType==0
c>=Timeout
Failure[id]?
(sBusy or SelectedFlag) and c>=1
(RequestType==0 and SelectedFlag)
c>=2
RequestType==0 and numSelects>=2
sBusy==0
Start
RequestSentInitial FailedOrSucceded
Wait
RequestDecided
c:=0
c:=0
c:=0
SelectedFlag:=true,
numSelects++
c:=0
RequestType:=ReqType
c:=0
Figure 5.7: Second Attacker Model in UPPAAL
attacker tags the device with ‘Close-only-Inhibit’ and the client fails to operate when sending an ‘Operate’
request with ‘Command’ attribute of either ‘Close’ or ‘Raise.’ Once we eliminate this tag from the attacker
model, all properties hold, indicating that there are no other vulnerabilities.
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Chapter 6
Transfer Set Object Modeling in
UPPAAL
6.1 Server Model
Figure 6.1 shows the model of the server in UPPAAL. Initially, a server has a certain number of Transfer Sets
available as modeled by the TransferSets variable. Clients connected to the server can ask for available
Transfer Sets from the server over the Requestchannel. Once a request is received by the server, it can
either assign a Transfer Set to the requesting client and send a success message over the Success[clientID]
channel or it could flag a failure to the requesting client over Failure[clientID] channel. Note here that
the variable clientID is a global variable which is set by the clients when sending a request to the server
and this helps server in sending the reply back to the correct client. Furthermore, server also maintains a
queue to keep track of which clients failed to get a Transfer Set and it makes one available to them as soon
as a Transfer Set is released by a client.
Success[headQueue()]!
Initialize?
Release?
Success[clientID]!
Failure[clientID]!
Request?
PendingRequests>0
PendingRequests==0
TransferSets>0
TransferSets==0
Start
ResourceReleased RequestReceivedWait
TransferSets--, deQueue(),
PendingRequests--
initialize()
TransferSets++,
ServerBusy=false,
ReleaseCount++
ServerBusy=true
TransferSets--,
ServerBusy=false
ServerBusy=false,
enQueue(clientID),
PendingRequests++
ServerBusy=true,
RequestCount++
Figure 6.1: Server’s model in UPPAAL
6.2 Client Model
The model of the client is shown in Figure 6.2. A client makes requests to the server if it has not acquired
(AcquiredTS) the desired number (DesiredTS) of Transfer Sets. Note that before making a request to the
server over the Request channel, the client synchronizes with an observer automata similar to that shown
in 5.4 by using the begin channel. This observer is used to measure the amount of time that elapses between
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the instance at which a request is sent by the client to the instance at which a success message is received.
If the client does not succeed in a given time limit then we say that the system has entered an unsafe state.
Also note that the client model is also capable of returning the acquired Transfer Sets back to the server.
This is modeled by using the Release channel. Once the client synchronizes over this channel, the server
adjusts the number of Transfer Sets and make one available to a client whose request might have failed
earlier.
c<=2
end! Success[id]?
end!
Request!
Initialize?
Release!
Failure[id]?
Success[id]?
begin!
c>=1
AcquiredTS==DesiredTS
and !ServerBusy
AcquiredTS<DesiredTS 
and !ServerBusy and c>=1
Wait2
Start
ReleaseResource RequestedWait
AcquiredTS++,
c:=0
c:=0
AcquiredTS--,
c:=0
Failed=true
AcquiredTS++,
c:=0
clientID:=id
Figure 6.2: Client’s model in UPPAAL
6.3 Correctness Property
For the purpose of checking the liveness property, we use A<> Client.DesiredTS == Client.AcquiredTS
as an invariant. This property asserts that the client would eventually acquire its desired count of Transfer
Sets. The property holds true in absence of an attacker since the DesiredTS < TransferSets available at
the server. Thus, our system exhibits liveness with respect to Transfer Set allocation.
6.4 Attacker Model
Figure 6.3 shows the model of the attacker. Note that it is quite similar to the client model. However, unlike
the client model, there is no lower or upper time bound on the rate of requests that an attacker can make,
rather we limit the number of requests that the attacker can make to the client. Note that in absence of
both constraints (i.e. timing as well as the request limit) the attacker would lead the whole system into a
time lock by making requests very fast while not allowing the time to pass. Another thing worth noticing
here is that as opposed to a legitimate client, the attacker does not have any upper limit on AcquiredTS
either. This is intentionally modeled into the system so that we can keep the attacker model generic and see
what problems it can cause in the system.
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Success[id]?
Request!
Initialize?
Release!
Failure[id]?
Success[id]?
c>=1
AcquiredTS>0
and !ServerBusy
!ServerBusy and Requests<=RequestLimit
Start
ReleaseResource
RequestedWait
AcquiredTS++AcquiredTS--,
c:=0
c:=0
c:=0
AcquiredTS++,
c:=0
clientID:=id,
Requests++
Figure 6.3: Attacker’s model in UPPAAL
6.5 Attacker Model Validation
The next step consists in attempting to verify the same liveness property but this time by adding an attacker
in the network. We connect an attacker to the server and as expected, verifying the liveness invariant in
presence of this attacker is not successful and the property was quickly violated (it took 0.10 seconds on
average for UPPAAL to generate a violation trace), validating that such an attacker can pose a threat to
legitimate clients and deny them service.
6.6 Auxiliary Models
Beside the models presented above, there are some other useful models that facilitate in checking the prop-
erties over the model. These include initializer, timer and observer model. We talk briefly about these
three here.
Initialize!
SystemStartedSystemIdle
Figure 6.4: Initializer Model in UPPAAL
x<=value
Set?
Timeout!
Set?
x==value
WaitingExpired
x:=0
x:=0
Figure 6.5: Timer Model
Figure 6.4 shows the model which is used to initialize all the other automata in the system by synchroniz-
ing with them over the Initialize channel. Furthermore, Figure 6.5 shows the timer used by the checker
model (to be covered in the next section) and helps facilitate the checker to move from one state to another
when a certain time has elapsed.
Figure 6.6 shows the observer model used in the system. Note that it is slightly different from the observer
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c<=timeout
begin?
begin?
end?
begin?
end?
begin?
c==timeout
Unsafe
Safe
Wait
c:=0
c:=0
c:=0
unsafe:=true
c:=0
Figure 6.6: Observer Model in UPPAAL
model shown earlier and has self-looping edges (e.g. in Unsafe state). These edges prevent the system from
deadlocks which otherwise may arise in absence of such edges.
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Chapter 7
Checker Design
7.1 SBO Checker
Following the iterative checker design loop described in Figure 2.1, we explore various designs informed
by the counter traces. For each design, we systematically tried to check, 1) if a legitimate client can be
prevented from accessing a device (see 5.5), and 2) whether an alarm is always raised when such denial-
of-service occurs. The latter check is encoded in UPPAAL as follows: A[] (client.Clock>Limit and
!client.SelectSuccess) imply checker.Alarm
We first design a checker to monitor for consecutive selects. This checker, described in Figure 7.1, is
based on the first counter trace collected and captures the specification that no legitimate client should send
multiple ‘Selects’ without an intermediate ‘Operate’ request. Verifying for the properties above revealed a
possible evasion technique in which an attacker can send a sequence of ‘Select’ and unsuccessful ‘Operate’
requests, keeping a device blocked all the time while exploiting the fact that the checker resets its counters
whenever it sees an ‘Operate’ request after a ‘Select’ request.
Request?
clientID!=attackerID
numSelects[attackerID]++
numSelects[attackerID]:=0
RequestType==1
RequestType==2
numSelects[attackerID]>=2
numSelects[attackerID]<2
RequestType==0 and clientID==attackerID
UpdateCountersWait Check
Alarm
Figure 7.1: Checker Model in UPPAAL
We refine this checker with two improvements: 1) rather than just counting the consecutive ‘Selects’,
we also look at the time between requests, and 2) we enable the checker to differentiate between successful
‘Operates’ from non-successful ones. The resulting design of the checker is shown in Figure 7.2. The
verification of the property show that this checker cannot be evaded and will always raise an alarm when an
attack occurs.
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Success[attackerID]?
Operate?
Request?
c:=0,
AlreadySelected:=true
Failure[attackerID]?
c<=Timeout
AlreadySelected:=false
RequestType!=0 or clientID!=attackerID
c>Timeout
Request?
RequestType==0 and clientID==attackerID
clientID!=attackerID
or RequestType==2
RequestType==1 and
clientID==attackerID
and AlreadySelected
RequestType==0 and
clientID==attackerID
and !AlreadySelectedStart Wait
RequestReceived
Operated
Alarm
NextRequest
c:=0
AlreadySelected:=false
Figure 7.2: New Checker Model in UPPAAL
Furthermore, we verify that this checker would not generate false positives by verifying that the following
property does not hold: E<> client.SelectSuccess and client.Clock>Limit and checker.Alarm. The
property claims that the three states can not be reached simultaneously and hence shows absence of false
positives.
7.2 TS Checker
7.2.1 Designing a Checker
This step consists of designing a checker that can analyze communications that reach ICCP servers and
identify abuses of the Transfer Set operations. Guided by our intuition, we designed a rate-based checker that
can trigger an alarm when a client requests too many Transfer Sets in a short period of time. Figure 7.3 shows
the model of the checker. The checker starts by initializing a timer via a synchronization channel. Once that
timer expires, the checker moves to Evaluate state from where it can either move to the AttackNotDetected
or AttackDetected state depending on whether or not the rate of Transfer Set requests has exceeded a certain
threshold.
AttackEverDetected=true,
RequestCount:=0
Initialize?
Timeout?
RequestCount:=0
started
Evaluate
Set! RequestCount/EvalTime>=ThreshRequestCount/EvalTime<Thresh
AttackDetected
Idle
TimerSet
AttackNotDetected
Figure 7.3: Checker’s model in UPPAAL
To check that our checker will eventually detect the attack when it happens, we verified the property
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Client.Failed−− >Checker.AttackEverDetected which failed showing that the attacker could exhaust
the Transfer Set even when it sends requests at very low rates. This counter trace motivated us to redesign
the checker. The new checker model is shown in Figure 7.4. In this model, rather than looking at the rate
of requests, we look at the rate of release of resources in a given time window. This checker is guided by the
intuition that if the rate of release of resources is below a given threshold then the client would eventually
be denied of resources.
Set!
Timeout?
Initialize?
ReleaseCount:=0
TimerSet
Idle
AttackNotDetected
Evaluate
ReleaseCount/EvalTime<Thresh
AttackDetected
ReleaseCount/EvalTime>=Thresh
AttackEverDetected=true,
ReleaseCount:=0started
Figure 7.4: Refined Checker model in UPPAAL
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Chapter 8
Prior Work
The complexity of network and communication protocols has made the analysis of their security a challenging
task. While everyone agrees on the importance of carefully studying the security properties of protocols,
different methods to conduct such analysis have been investigated. Manual inspection appears commonly
adopted by standard bodies but, unfortunately, manually keeping track of the complexity of the many
functionalities and protocol state combinations is hard and error prone, even for skilled experts.
A more rigorous approach is to rely on a mathematical framework to prove for all possible protocol
states that security properties hold. Formal methods have gained in popularity but still face important
limitations that prevent wide adoption. Formal verification consists in proving that a system satisfies its
formal specifications [10]. This requires writing the specifications in a formal mathematical language and
then using either a theorem prover or a model checker to verify the satisfaction of a given set of properties.
This approach has been successfully used to verify hardware designs [1], [16]. With respect to software
and to communication protocols in particular, the larger number of system states and interactions among
components often leads to combinatorial explosion [7].
As observed by [12], research efforts to apply formal methods focus either on verifying the correctness
of authentication or encryption procedures [8], [9], [15], [2], or on conducting vulnerability analysis at the
level of the network rather than the protocol [3], [4], [13]. As a result, the security posture of protocols
that have not been designed with security in mind is still not well understood. In particular, time-based
vulnerabilities such as denial-of-service (DoS) are difficult to formalize because of the unbounded nature of
time. [12] offers initial steps towards addressing this challenge by proposing a model checking approach to
automatically identify threats to a subset of IEEE 802.16 WiMAX protocols. We follow the same direction
by providing a practical case study of applying model checking to study vulnerabilities and checker design
for the ICCP standard.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
We showed that model checking can not only help reveal the sequence of actions that can lead ICCP
client/server into bad states but it could also help in the design of specialized communication protocol
checkers. These checkers are desirable as they can secure ICCP against exploitation of protocol vulnerabilities
without modifying the protocol. As case studies, we described the formal design and verification (using
UPPAAL) of a communication checker for ICCP that protects against the exploitation of resource exhaustion
vulnerabilities. Formal design and verification provide a structured way to explore the design space for
checkers, and are necessary to ensure that the checkers can indeed secure the protocol against exploitations.
While formal methods run into scalability issues with larger models, careful protocol abstraction, and use of
other state space reduction techniques could alleviate the problem.
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Appendix A
UPPAAL Background
A timed automaton is represented in UPPAAL as a finite state machine that can have time bounds on the
states (known as invariants) as well as on the transitions (known as guards). Each automata in UPPAAL
requires an initial location which is represented by a double circle. Depending on the guards on the transitions
associated with the initial location, the automata takes one of the enabled edges non-deterministically to
move to the connected destination location. Here, the enabled edge is defined as the transition for which the
guard evaluates to true. A guard can be composed of conditions on local/global variables in the model or can
be conditioned on clocks in the model or can be the combination of the two. Furthermore, a transition could
either be internal or external. An external transition is synchronized with another automaton in the system:
one of the automata signals the other automaton using synchronization channels and both the automata
take their respective transitions to new locations. Note that guards on the edges of both the automata needs
to be true in order for this synchronization to take place. Moreover, an automata can also update system
variables on a given transition with new values. Variables also contribute to the state space of the system
unless they are declared as ‘meta’ variables. Meta variables are temporary variables which can only be used
when synchronizing between two automata. Table A.1 summarizes the entities, their functionality as well as
the color code as they appear in UPPAAL models.
Table A.1: UPPAAL’s Entities’ Details
Name Color Purpose
Invariants Orchid To force an automata out of a given state after some time
Guards Green To decide which transition is enabled when
Updates Dark Blue To change the values of variables in the system
Synchronization Light Blue To send/receive a signal to/from another automaton
State Names Pink To identify states in an automaton
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Appendix B
List of Conformance Blocks of ICCP
Table B.1: ICCP Blocks and Related Services
Block Name Objects Services Access Control Specification
1 Basic Services
Association
Initiate
Conclude
Abort
Data Value
Get Data Value Visibility
Set Data Value Get Data Value
Get Data Value Names Set Data Value
Get Data Value Type Get Data Value Type
Data Set
Create Data Set Visibility
Delete Data Set Delete Data Set
Get Data Set Element Values Get Data Set Element Values
Set Data Set Element Values Set Data Set Element Values
Get Data Set Names Get Data Set Element Names
Get Data Set Element Names
DSTransfer Set
Start Transfer Visibility
Stop Transfer Start Transfer
Data Set Transfer Set Condition
Monitoring
Stop Transfer
Stop Transfer
Next DSTrans-
fer Set
Get Next DSTransfer Set Value
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Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
Block Name Objects Services Access Control Specification
2 Extended
Data Set
Condition
Monitoring
3 Blocked
Transfers
4
Information
Message
Information
Message
IMTransfer Set
Start Transfer Visibility
Stop Transfer Start Transfer
Data Set Transfer Set Condition
Monitoring
Stop Transfer
5 Device Control Device
Select Visibility
Operate Select
Get Tag Operate
Set Tag Set Tag
Timeout
Local Reset
Success
Failure
6 Programs Program
Start Visibility
Stop Start
Resume Stop
Reset Resume
Kill Reset
Get Program Attributes Kill
Get Program Attributes
7 Events
Event Condition Event Notification
Event Enrollment
Create Event Enrollment Visibility
Delete Event Enrollment Event Enrollment
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Table B.1 – Continued from previous page
Block Name Objects Services Access Control Specification
Get Event Enrollment Attributes Get Event Enrollment Attributes
8
Accounts/
Additional
User Objects
TATransfer Set
Start Transfer Visibility
Stop Transfer Start Transfer
Transfer Account TS Condition
Monitoring
Stop Transfer
9 Time Series
TSTransfer Set
Start Transfer Visibility
Stop Transfer Start Transfer
Time Series TS Condition Moni-
toring
Stop Transfer
Get Next TSTransfer Set Name
Next TSTransfer Set Get Next TSTransfer Set Value
29
Appendix C
Model Parameter Description
Table C.1: Model Variables and Their Description
Name Description Values
Global numClients ID range of clients 0:Client,1:Attacker
Request Channel from
client/attacker to client
N/A
Success[id] Channel from server to
client/attacker
N/A
Failure[id] Channel from server to
client/attacker
N/A
Select Channel from server to de-
vice
N/A
Operate Channel from server to de-
vice
N/A
SetTag Channel from server to de-
vice
N/A
Error Channel from device to
server
N/A
Armed Channel from device to
server
N/A
Operated Channel from device to
server
N/A
DevTagged Channel from device to
server
N/A
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Table C.1 – Continued from previous page
Name Description Values
RequestType Shared variable between
client/attacker and server
0:Select,1:Operate,2:Tag
Tag Shared variable between
client/attacker and server
0:Other,1:Close-Only-
Inhibit,2:Open-and-close-
inhibit,3:No-tag
RequestType Shared variable between
client/attacker and server
0:Select,1:Operate,2:Tag
Cmd t Range of Command values
used when operating de-
vice
0:Close—Raise,1:Other
Req t Range of request types
used by the clients
0:Select,1:Operate,2:Tag
Tag t Range of request types
used by the clients
0:Select,1:Operate,2:Tag
sBusy Flag to determine server’s
busy status
0:NotBusy,1:Busy
clientID ID of the client that made
the most recent request
0:Client,1:Attacker
Timeout Time after which the de-
vice times out from armed
to idle state
4 units
Client c Clock for timing certain
states
Infinite
SelectSuccess Auxiliary variable for ver-
ifying a property
True/False
OperateSuccess Auxiliary variable for ver-
ifying a property
True/False
Attacker c Clock for timing certain
states
Infinite
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Table C.1 – Continued from previous page
Name Description Values
Device c Clock for timing certain
states
Infinite
Tagged Current Tag of the device 0:Other,1:Close-Only-
Inhibit,2:Open-and-close-
inhibit,3:No-tag
lastArmID Records the ID of client
that armed the device re-
cently
0:Client,1:Attacker
lastTagID Records the ID of client
that tagged the device re-
cently
0:Client,1:Attacker
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